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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Appellant, Scott Specialty Gases, Inc. ("Scott"), appeals 
from a judgment entered in favor of its former employee, 
Christine Rush. In her complaint Rush asserted that Scott 
discriminated against her in promotion and training on the 
basis of her sex and subjected her to a hostile environment 
through sexual harassment. She also claimed that Scott 
improperly constructively discharged her and retaliated 
against her for filing a complaint against it with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission. Finally, she 
asserted federal and state Equal Pay Act claims and state 
common law tort and contract claims. The jury awarded 
Rush several million dollars in compensatory and punitive 
damages on her discrimination in promotion and training, 
sexual harassment, and constructive discharge claims, but 
on Scott's motion, the district court found that the damages 
were excessive and significantly reduced them in a 
remittitur. Rush accepted the remittitur rather than going 
through a new trial, so the court entered judgment for the 
reduced amounts. Scott has filed a timely appeal. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and the district court 
had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § § 1331 and 1367(a). 
 
Scott contends that Rush's employment discrimination 
claim based on failure to promote and train is time barred 
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and cannot be saved by application of the continuing 
violation theory. We agree; allowing Rush to sue on the 
failure to promote and train claim, and to introduce 
evidence supporting that claim, prejudiced Scott's case on 
Rush's other claims because we cannot say that the failure 
to promote and train evidence did not contribute to the 
jury's findings of liability on the sexual harassment hostile 
environment and constructive discharge claims. 
Furthermore, we cannot say that the evidence with respect 
to the failure to promote and train claim did not affect the 
computation of the damages awarded. Therefore, we will 
reverse the judgment entered in favor of Rush and remand 
the case to the district court to enter judgment in Scott's 
favor on Rush's failure to promote and train claim and to 
grant a new trial on her sexual harassment and 
constructive discharge claims. For reasons which we 
explain below the retaliation, Equal Pay Act, and common 
law claims are no longer in the case and thus will not be 
retried. 
 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Scott employed Rush as a Laboratory Technician I from 
September 11, 1989, until her resignation on June 10, 
1993. Periodically, Rush changed from a full-time to a part- 
time status to pursue her education. In September 1990, 
Rush went part time so that she could take course work in 
chemistry. During the fall of 1990, Scott conducted a flask- 
making course which trained some Lab Tech Is in skills 
needed for promotion to Lab Tech II analyst positions. Scott 
intended to use the training course as a promotion device 
and planned to promote the highest performing Lab Tech Is 
to Lab Tech IIs. Rush claims she was not informed about 
the class, although several male employees were, and that 
Scott thereby deprived her of an important opportunity for 
training and advancement within the laboratory. Rush also 
claims that she and Scott were unable to agree upon an 
arrangement through which she could watch the course on 
videotape so that she could become eligible for promotion. 
Ultimately, in early 1991 Scott promoted three men with 
less seniority than Rush to Lab Tech II analyst positions 
based on their performance in the flask-making class. 
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In June 1991, Rush filed a charge with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, claiming that Scott 
discriminated against her in training and promotion 
because of her sex. She based this charge on her exclusion 
from the flask-making course and the attendant 
opportunity for promotion as well as other alleged 
discrimination in training, promotion, and work 
assignments. In the fall of 1991, Rush and Scott entered 
into a written settlement agreement in which Rush agreed 
not to file suit against Scott based on her EEOC charge. 
App. at 2173. Rush also executed a release in which she 
agreed to: 
 
release and forever discharge Scott. . . of and from all 
claims and causes of action alleged in, or which could 
have been alleged in a Charge filed with the Equal 
Opportunity Commission and numbered Charge No. 
170911136 and any other charge or complaint she has 
filed or could have filed with any other agency or court 
alleging discrimination in connection with her 
employment by Scott, including without limitation, her 
claim that she discriminatorily was denied promotion. 
 
App. at 2172. In return, Scott agreed to meet with Rush to 
discuss its policy regarding training and promotion; to 
provide Rush the same training and experience other 
employees seeking promotion to Lab Tech II analyst 
positions received; and to consider Rush for the next 
available Lab Tech II analyst position. App. at 2173. 
 
Following the execution of the settlement agreement, 
Rush met with lab manager Mark Sirinides, who explained 
the requirements for promotion to a Lab Tech II analyst 
position. In March 1992, Scott allowed Rush and some of 
her co-workers to take the flask-making course via 
videotape. She received the highest grade in the class. On 
June 15, 1992, Scott certified to the EEOC that Rush had 
completed the required training course and, in accordance 
with the settlement agreement, would be considered "when 
a vacancy in Lab Tech II Analyst position commensurate 
with her skills occurs." App. at 2193. 
 
In June 1992, Scott promoted a male Lab Tech I, Garren 
Knoll, to a Lab Tech II position. Rush contends, and Scott 
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agrees, that it did not consider Rush for this promotion, 
explaining that in its view Rush was not qualified for this 
position. According to Scott, it promoted Knoll to a 
computer technician or automation position, not a 
laboratory analyst position. Also, in the summer of 1992, 
Scott hired a male college student, Mark Carpenter, on a 
part-time basis to do Lab Tech II work. Scott claimed that 
because this was a temporary, part-time position, Rush 
was not eligible for it. During her tenure at Scott, Scott 
never promoted Rush who remained a Lab Tech I. 
 
Rush claims that after she filed her 1991 EEOC charge, 
her male co-workers and some supervisory and managerial 
employees sexually harassed her. She asserts that she 
unavailingly complained about this harassment at various 
levels of Scott's management. Sirinides wrote a memo to 
plant manager John Post outlining Rush's complaints and 
asking for guidance and training on how to deal with such 
complaints. Neither Post nor regional vice-president William 
Gittler, both of whom saw Sirinides' memo, responded to 
the complaints. 
 
In March 1993, Rush again arranged to work part time; 
her application noted that she based her request on her 
desire to pursue her education and that she was 
dissatisfied with her working environment. On May 27, 
1993, Rush and some co-workers arrived late to work, but 
she claims that Ted Neeme, a group leader in the laboratory 
who apparently had supervisory duties, singled her out for 
an oral reprimand. App. at 468-69. A shouting match 
ensued between Rush and Neeme, and then Rush threw 
her time card on Neeme's desk and left the premises. App. 
at 471-72. She did not return to Scott until June 1, 1993. 
 
On June 10, 1993, Rush resigned. At some point during 
that day, either just before her resignation, or just after, a 
meeting was held at Scott's premises from which Rush was 
excluded. At this meeting, Post, the plant manager, asked 
Rush's co-employees how Scott should discipline her for 
her earlier outburst to Neeme and permitted them to 
criticize Rush. App. at 426, 486. On her resignation form, 
Rush noted that she felt forced to leave Scott. App. at 2167. 
 
On November 1, 1993, Rush filed a discrimination claim 
with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission; the 
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charge was cross-filed with the EEOC. After Rush received 
a right to sue letter, she filed suit in the district court 
against Scott on February 8, 1995. Her complaint alleged 
discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII, 
the Federal and Pennsylvania Equal Pay Acts, and the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"). In addition, 
Rush asserted a claim against Scott for allegedly retaliating 
against her for filing the first EEOC charge and claims 
under Pennsylvania common law. She also claimed that 
Scott had constructively discharged her. 
 
Prior to the trial, both parties moved for summary 
judgment. As germane to this opinion, Scott claimed that 
all of Rush's claims that accrued prior to January 5, 1993, 
i.e., 300 days before she filed her second EEOC claim, were 
time barred. Of course, Scott promoted Knoll and hired 
Carpenter long before January 5, 1993, and thus it argued 
that Rush could not base a claim on those employment 
actions. Nevertheless, the district court denied Scott's 
motion for summary judgment to the extent it was 
predicated on the time bar, reasoning that the case involved 
a violation throughout her employment at Scott. Rush v. 
Scott Specialty Gases, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 104, 106-07 (E.D. 
Pa. 1996). The court, however, granted Scott summary 
judgment on the Pennsylvania Equal Pay Act claim and 
granted it partial summary judgment on Rush's common 
law claim. 
 
At the ensuing two-week trial, the jury found in favor of 
Rush on her Title VII and PHRA failure to promote and 
train, sexual harassment, and constructive discharge 
claims, and awarded her $203,000 in lost wages, 
$1,000,000 in pain and suffering, and $3,000,000 in 
punitive damages. However, the jury found for Scott on 
Rush's retaliation claim. The court dismissed the Federal 
Equal Pay Act claim on Scott's motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
50; thus that claim is no longer in the case. Rush elected 
not to proceed with her remaining common law claim at 
trial, and we thus are not concerned with that claim. 
 
Following the return of the verdict, Scott moved for 
judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, or, in the 
alternative, for a remittitur. The district court denied the 
motion for judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that 
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the evidence supported the verdict. Rush v. Scott Specialty 
Gases, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 194, 197 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The 
district court also found that although a new trial was not 
warranted on the basis of the weight of the evidence or 
because of any evidentiary errors or improper jury 
instructions, the awards for pain and suffering and punitive 
damages were excessive. Id. at 199, 202. Accordingly, the 
court denied the motion for a new trial but it conditioned 
the denial on Rush's acceptance of a remittitur in the 
amount of $900,000 on the pain and suffering award and 
a remittitur of the punitive damages award in the amount 
of $2,700,000. The remittitur left Rush with an award of 
$203,000 in compensatory damages, $100,000 for pain and 
suffering, and $300,000 for punitive damages. Rush agreed 
to this remittitur, and on July 15, 1996, the court entered 
judgment for Rush in the amount of $603,000. The court 
subsequently granted Rush prejudgment interest and 
awarded her counsel fees of $210,062.50 and costs of 
$11,562.05. Scott has filed a timely appeal. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
Scott argues that Rush did not administrativelyfile her 
failure to promote and train and her sexual harassment 
claims in a timely manner so this action largely is barred. 
Scott also advances challenges to the jury instructions, 
evidentiary rulings, and sufficiency of the evidence and 
asserts that the PHRA does not provide for punitive 
damages. We conclude that the hostile environment sexual 
harassment claim was timely, the failure to promote and 
train claim was time barred, and the introduction of 
evidence with respect to Scott's failure to promote and train 
Rush based on her sex infected the entire trial. Accordingly, 
we will reverse the judgment in favor of Rush and remand 
for a new trial on Rush's hostile environment sexual 
harassment and constructive discharge claims and for 
entry of judgment in favor of Scott on the failure to promote 
and train claim. This disposition makes it unnecessary to 
consider Scott's other assertions of error. 
 
A. The Continuing Violation Theory 
 
The parties are in agreement that under Title VII the 
ordinary time for filing a charge of employment 
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discrimination with the EEOC is 300 days after the alleged 
discrimination when the charge is filed first, as here, with 
the appropriate Pennsylvania state agency. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(e)(1). 
 
Though the requirement sounds exacting -- 300 days 
after the alleged unlawful employment practice 
occurred -- courts have grappled with cases presenting 
questions of precisely when a `practice' occurred. That 
date may be more inflexible when there is a discrete 
trigger event and the discrimination is overt. However, 
there are cases in which the plaintiff does not know he 
has been harmed; similarly there are cases of an 
ongoing, continuous violation. To accommodate these 
more indeterminate situations, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that the filing of a timely charge is`a 
requirement that, like a statute of limitation, is subject 
to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.' 
 
West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 754 (3d Cir. 
1995) (citations omitted). Rush filed the requisite EEOC 
claim on November 1, 1993. Consequently, the 300-day 
retrospective limitations period which ordinarily would bar 
claims for earlier events began to run on January 5, 1993. 
 
The continuing violation theory allows a "plaintiff [to] 
pursue a Title VII claim for discriminatory conduct that 
began prior to the filing period if he can demonstrate that 
the act is part of an ongoing practice or pattern of 
discrimination of the defendant." Id. at 754 (citations 
omitted). In considering this issue, we note that the parties 
in their briefs do not clearly delineate between the record 
on the motion for summary judgment and the record at 
trial. While in some cases this lack of precision could 
present a problem on appeal, here it does not because, on 
any view of the facts, Scott was entitled to a judgment on 
the failure to promote and train claim. Similarly, on any 
view of the facts, Rush's hostile environment sexual 
harassment claim was not time barred, even with respect to 
conduct occurring prior to January 5, 1993. 
 
We also note that in some circumstances the procedure 
followed in deciding whether there is a continuing violation 
might impact on the scope of review. There is authority that 
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a trial court's ruling on whether there is a continuing 
violation is reviewed on the clearly erroneous standard. 
Calloway v. Partners Nat'l Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446, 448 
(11th Cir. 1993); Abrams v. Baylor College of Med., 805 
F.2d 528, 532 (5th Cir. 1986). Yet the district court ruled 
on the continuing violation argument by denying Scott's 
motion for summary judgment; this procedural posture 
suggests that plenary review might be appropriate. 
Furthermore, in West, in which we considered the 
employee's argument that there had been a continuing 
violation in the context of reviewing determinations on the 
admission of evidence, we suggested that we were 
exercising at least a degree of plenary review. West, 45 F.3d 
at 748 ("We conclude, in this hostile work environment 
context, that the scope of the admissibility of evidence of 
events, which preceded the 300-day period, must be 
grounded in the substantive law at issue."); id. at 752 ("We 
review the evidentiary determinations of the trial court 
under an abuse of discretion standard. . . . However, as to 
the application or interpretation of a legal standard 
underlying the admissibility decision, our review is 
plenary.") (citations omitted). 
 
In this case, however, we need not linger on the scope of 
review issue because even on a deferential clearly 
erroneous standard of review, we would reverse with 
respect to the failure to promote and train claim; and even 
on a plenary review, we would hold that the continuing 
violation theory was applicable to the sexually hostile 
environment claim. Cf. Konstantopoulous v. Westvaco Corp., 
No. 94-7462, slip op. at 15 n.1 (3d Cir. May 6, 1997) 
("Here, we find it unnecessary to decide which standard of 
review to apply because under either standard we see no 
ground for reversing the district court's decision."). Thus, 
we apply the standard of review most favorable to the party 
against whom we are making particular determinations. 
 
To demonstrate a continuing violation, the plaintifffirst 
must show that at least one discriminatory act occurred 
within the 300-day period. West, 45 F.3d at 754. Second, 
the plaintiff must show that "the harassment is`more than 
the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts of intentional 
discrimination,' " and instead must demonstrate a 
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continuing pattern of discrimination. Id. at 755 (citation 
omitted). A plaintiff satisfying these requirements may 
present evidence and recover damages for the entire 
continuing violation, and the 300-day filing period will not 
act as a bar. Id. 
 
We have followed Berry v. Board of Supervisors of 
Louisiana State Univ., 715 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1983), the 
leading case on the continuing violation theory. The Berry 
court enumerated several factors relevant to the 
determination of whether a plaintiff has demonstrated a 
continuing violation: 
 
The first is subject matter. Do the alleged acts involve 
the same type of discrimination, tending to connect 
them in a continuing violation? The second is 
frequency. Are the alleged acts recurring. . . or more in 
the nature of an isolated work assignment or 
employment decision? The third factor, perhaps of 
most importance, is degree of permanence. Does the 
act have the degree of permanence which should 
trigger an employee's awareness of and duty to assert 
his or her rights, or which should indicate to the 
employee that the continued existence of the adverse 
consequences of the act is to be expected without being 
dependent on a continuing intent to discriminate? 
 
Id. at 981 (footnote omitted); see also West, 45 F.3d at 755 
n.9. 
 
1. The Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claim 
 
Scott argues that Rush should have filed her sexual 
harassment claim earlier than November 1, 1993, and that 
she therefore should not have been permitted to sue on or 
present evidence of sexual harassment occurring prior to 
the start of the 300-day limitations period. Rush responds 
that she was not aware in 1991 when she filed her initial 
EEOC complaint that she had been subjected to sexual 
harassment, and she also contends that the harassment 
she experienced constituted a continuing violation so that 
all of the harassment, even that occurring before January 
5, 1993, was actionable. 
 
As we explained in West, there is "a natural affinity" 
between the theory underlying hostile environment claims 
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and the continuing violation theory. West, 45 F.3d at 755. 
A sexually hostile work environment often "results from 
acts of sexual. . . harassment which are pervasive and 
continue over time, whereas isolated or single incidents of 
harassment are insufficient to constitute a hostile 
environment." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Galloway v. General Motors Serv. Parts 
Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1166 (7th Cir. 1996). The Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Galloway expressed its 
desire to encourage plaintiffs to commence litigation when 
they become aware of conduct that would support a viable 
claim without forcing them to do so prematurely. Id. at 
1166. Thus, the court concluded that a plaintiff "may not 
base her. . . suit on conduct that occurred outside the 
statute of limitations unless it would have been 
unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to sue before the 
statute ran on that conduct, as in a case in which the 
conduct could constitute, or be recognized, as actionable 
harassment only in the light of events that occurred later, 
within the period of the statute of limitations." Id. at 1167 
(citations omitted). 
 
Rush testified that when she filed her original EEOC 
complaint in 1991 she did not include claims for sexual 
harassment because 
 
it was not really as frequently [sic], it later intensified 
but at that time it was a lot less frequent. I'm not sure 
I recognized it at that time. And, whereas the 
discrimination was more obvious to me. I also felt that 
at that time I was friendly with Rene, which he was the 
biggest problem and maybe I was not clear enough, 
maybe I didn't turn around and yell at him, I didn't I 
figured it wouldn't be fair . . . to complain. 
 
App. at 376-77. Rush testified that at the beginning of her 
employment, Rene Bedoya, her co-worker and primary 
harasser, treated her nicely, and, although perhaps overly 
attentive, his behavior was not problematic. App. at 412-13. 
On redirect examination, Rush read into the record part of 
her diary where she noted that the harassment began after 
she filed the EEOC charge. App. at 661. 
 
Rush also testified that she was harassed by male co- 
workers on a daily basis. App. at 402. This harassment 
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included disparaging remarks and criticism of her work. 
App. at 403-04. Rush testified that Bedoya's behavior 
changed and that he began to touch her inappropriately 
and sexually at work, to make sexual comments to her, and 
to be rude to her. App. at 416-19, 421. Rush also testified 
that her co-worker Tom Richards made inappropriate 
comments to her and about her. She stated that she partly 
overheard, and another co-worker told her, that Richards 
had said he "wanted to fuck [Rush] in his van, and then 
shoot [Rush] in the head so that no one would ever know." 
App. at 421-22. 
 
The district court correctly concluded that Rush's sexual 
harassment claim constituted a continuing violation. She 
properly was permitted to sue on this continuing violation 
and to present evidence of incidents occurring prior to the 
limitations period. First, the 300-day period began to run 
on January 5, 1993, and it is clear that there were episodes 
of alleged harassment after that point, including the 
meeting that occurred on her last day of employment, as 
well as the continual comments by Bedoya and Rush's 
other co-workers. Second, the evidence supports a finding 
that Rush suffered continuous sexual harassment, at least 
from the time she filed the original EEOC charge. The 
harassment did not consist of unrelated, isolated incidents, 
but constituted a continuous pattern of derogatory 
remarks, rude behavior, and discriminatory conduct. Her 
failure to claim harassment in the 1991 EEOC charge does 
not destroy her claim, because the evidence shows that the 
harassment intensified after the charge was filed, and, 
moreover, she did not realize early on how pervasive or 
severe the harassment was. 
 
2. The Failure to Promote Claim 
 
Scott argues that Rush's failure to promote and train 
claim predicated on sexual discrimination was not timely 
filed because she did not allege any instances of 
discriminatory failure to promote and train after January 5, 
1993.1 Rush argues that the sex discrimination in training 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Scott also argues that the settlement agreement and Rush's release 
prohibit her from litigating her failure to promote and train claim. 
Because we find the failure to promote and train claim time barred, it is 
not necessary to address either the effect of the release on the viability 
of Rush's claim or Rush's ability to repudiate the release. 
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and promotion was a continuing violation during her three 
and one-half years at Scott. The district court found that 
Rush's failure to promote and train claim was not time 
barred because the continuing violation theory applied to it. 
This finding was in error. 
 
Neither the promotion of Garren Knoll to a Lab Tech II 
position nor the hiring of Mark Carpenter to perform 
temporarily Lab Tech II work occurred within the 300-day 
limitations period. In an effort to avoid a conclusion that 
her failure to promote and train claim was time barred, 
Rush argues that the gradual change in Knoll's duties from 
primarily computer and automation work to primarily 
laboratory analysis work demonstrates that although Scott 
actually had a need to hire additional Lab Tech II analysts, 
it refused to promote her. 
 
Although Knoll's performance of analysis work greatly 
increased beginning in January 1993, app. at 1590, 1596, 
Scott's assignment of analysis work to Knoll did not 
constitute a discriminatory failure to promote occurring 
within the limitations period. Scott was not required to 
promote an additional person to perform the analysis work 
it ultimately assigned to Knoll. Knoll's promotion to the Lab 
Tech II position was a discrete incident; Scott filled the 
vacancy in June 1992. After that time, aside from the part- 
time summer position Carpenter filled, no new Lab Tech II 
positions became available. The change in Knoll's work 
assignment did not require that Scott demote him or create 
a new Lab Tech II position for Rush. Of course, her attempt 
to predicate her claim on Carpenter's hiring is also 
unavailing. Rush was required to make a timely challenge 
to the actual failure to consider her for promotion, and she 
did not do so. Therefore, she cannot claim that Scott's 
alleged discrimination in promotion was a continuing 
violation. 
 
In a further effort to bolster her argument that her failure 
to promote and train claim was filed timely, Rush contends 
Scott's discrimination in training and discipline, as well as 
the sexual harassment she suffered, continued throughout 
her employment and can be used to establish a continuing 
violation that would include Scott's failure to promote her. 
We reject this argument. 
 
                                13 
Rush's failure to promote and train claim is distinct from 
her sexual harassment claim and cannot be regarded as 
having been timely by reason of her other allegations of 
discriminatory treatment. Rush's failure to promote and 
train claim addresses discrete instances of alleged 
discrimination that are not susceptible to a continuing 
violation analysis. We reiterate that Scott's promotion of 
Knoll and hiring of Carpenter were independent events that 
put Rush on notice to file a charge of discrimination. Rush 
knew from the settlement agreement that she was to be 
considered for the next available Lab Tech II position. If she 
believed Scott was not considering her for available 
positions as promised, she should have reacted at that 
time. Waiting to see what would happen next was pointless; 
the harm, if any, already was inflicted. 
 
Additionally, neither the sexual harassment nor the other 
alleged discriminatory acts were related sufficiently to 
Rush's failure to promote and train claim to constitute a 
single continuing violation. The sexual harassment and 
failure to promote and train claims address different types 
of conduct. Rush's failure to promote and train claim 
focuses on the failure to promote Rush to, or prepare her 
for, a Lab Tech II analyst position. By contrast, the sexual 
harassment claim focuses on the use of foul language, 
demeaning comments, and inappropriate touching by her 
co-workers and some managers. These are distinct claims. 
 
Similarly, although she has alleged disparity in discipline 
falling within the limitations period, these claims are not 
related factually to the failure to promote and train claims. 
While she still may have a viable and timely claim for 
discrimination in discipline, this claim is not sufficiently 
related to the failure to promote and train claim to enable 
us to regard the failure to promote and train claim as part 
of a continuing violation. 
 
Finally, although there is a factual nexus between Rush's 
failure to promote and failure to train claims, which we 
have been considering together, treating them as separate 
claims does not affect our result.2 Rush has not alleged 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The district court treated the failure to promote and failure to train 
claims together by submitting them to the jury in a single special 
interrogatory. 
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specific failure to train incidents within the limitations 
period. Indeed, most of the allegations supporting Rush's 
failure to train claim stem from Scott's failure to include 
her in the original flask-making class as well as her 
requests prior to that class for more advanced training. She 
also complained of Scott's failure to train her properly for 
the position for which she was hired. Thus, the failure to 
train allegations do not bring her failure to promote claim 
to a time within the limitations period. Moreover, a failure 
to train claim arising within the 300-day limitations period 
would be distinct from a claim predicated on Scott's earlier 
failures to promote Rush. 
 
We recently have had occasion to consider a situation 
which demonstrates that a court must be circumspect in 
relating discrete incidents to each other. In Konstantopoulos 
v. Westvaco Corp., slip op. at 10, a plaintiff who was 
employed by the defendant for two distinct time periods, 
with a seven-month interruption between them, argued 
"that the district court improperly evaluated the events that 
occurred during her second period of employment in 
isolation and that instead the court should have viewed 
them as a continuation of the harassment that had taken 
place seven months earlier." We rejected the argument, in 
part because the seven-month gap allowed the effects of the 
earlier incidents to dissipate. Konstantopoulos demonstrates 
that a careful analysis must be made before acts are 
considered part of a pattern. There, the passage of time and 
the employee's interruption of employment destroyed the 
pattern. Here, there was no pattern because the failure to 
promote and train claim was distinct from the sexual 
harassment claim and the other allegations of 
discrimination. 
 
The district court erred when it held that Rush's failure 
to promote and train claim was a continuing violation that 
was not time barred. The incidents relevant to the claim 
occurred in the spring and summer of 1992; Rush did not 
file her EEOC claim for almost 18 months thereafter. Her 
claim was time barred and cannot be saved by any of the 
alleged discrimination or harassment occurring within the 
limitations period. Furthermore, we have no intention of 
shredding the 300-day limitations period by automatically 
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allowing an employee who alleges actionable conduct 
occurring within that period to make claims with respect to 
any adverse employment actions that occurred during his 
or her entire period of employment. Rather, a district court 
must scrutinize the claims to establish that they are 
related. See West, 45 F.3d at 755 (refusing to adopt per se 
rule that every hostile environment claim constitutes a 
continuing violation). To allow a stale claim to proceed 
would be inconsistent with the administrative procedure 
established by Title VII which contemplates prompt filing of 
charges so that discrimination controversies may be 
resolved promptly. See EEOC v. University of Pennsylvania, 
850 F.2d 969, 978 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Upholding the 
University's first-filed suit in this context would undermine 
the congressional policy favoring prompt resolution of 
discrimination claims."), aff'd on other grounds, 493 U.S. 
182, 110 S.Ct. 577 (1990). Accordingly, we will reverse the 
judgment in favor of Rush on the failure to promote and 
train claim and remand for the district court to enter 
judgment in favor of Scott on that claim. 
 
3. Other Claims 
 
The jury answered special interrogatories, rendering 
separate liability verdicts on each of Rush's claims. App. at 
219-20. Similarly, the court instructed the jury to calculate 
damages separately for each category of damages claimed. 
App. at 220-21. However, the court did not instruct the jury 
to attribute specific portions of the damages awards to the 
individual counts on which it found Scott liable. Our review 
of the record compels the conclusion that the presence of 
the failure to promote and train claim and the introduction 
of evidence related to and supporting that claim infected 
the jury's liability verdicts on the sexual harassment and 
constructive discharge claims as well as the verdict for the 
damages. 
 
Indeed, Rush has claimed that the sexual harassment 
and Scott's failure to promote and train her were related. 
She testified that she believed the harassment was part of 
her co-workers' and management's plan to force her out of 
the lab. App. at 420, 496. Rush reiterated this theory at 
oral argument, contending that the same managerial 
personnel, particularly Sirinides, who failed to stop the 
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sexual harassment were also responsible for Scott's failure 
to promote her. At trial, witnesses testified about both the 
alleged failure to promote and train and the alleged 
harassment, and the evidence supporting the claims was 
presented in tandem. 
 
It is not possible to ascertain what portions of the 
compensatory and punitive damages awards were 
attributable to the time-barred failure to promote and train 
claim, so we must reverse the damages awards. 
Furthermore, given Rush's theory of the case and the 
manner in which evidence was presented, we are unable to 
find that the evidence of discriminatory failure to promote 
and train did not affect the jury's verdict on liability on the 
sexual harassment hostile environment claim. At a 
minimum, the evidence of Scott's failure to promote and 
train Rush was highly prejudicial to Scott on the 
harassment claim. We therefore will reverse the jury's 
liability verdict on the hostile environment sexual 
harassment claim as well. Similarly, Rush's constructive 
discharge claim was not linked exclusively to either the 
failure to promote and train claim or the harassment claim, 
so the verdict on this claim, too, may have been influenced 
by the evidence offered in support of the failure to promote 
and train claim. Accordingly, we also will reverse the 
judgment in favor of Rush on her constructive discharge 
claim. 
 
The jury found in favor of Scott on Rush's retaliation 
claim. Rush has not filed a cross-appeal from the entry of 
judgment in favor of Scott on that claim, so the judgment 
on the retaliation claim will stand. See, e.g., Abrams v. 
Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1995) ("While we 
note that the instructions as to the ADEA claim may have 
required Abrams to demonstrate more than he was required 
to under the appropriate standard, Abrams has not cross- 
appealed on that ground and we therefore leave the 
judgment undisturbed as to the ADEA claim."); Winston v. 
Children and Youth Servs., 948 F.2d 1380, 1385 (3d Cir. 
1991) (declining to consider issue appellees failed to raise 
in cross-appeal or mention in brief). Finally, as we already 
have indicated, the Equal Pay Act and common law claims 
are out of the case, and Rush has not appealed from their 
dismissal. 
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B. Punitive Damages 
 
Scott argues that punitive damages are not available 
under the PHRA as a matter of law. Although this question 
might arise again at the retrial, we decline to address it at 
this juncture. 
 
"In adjudicating a case under state law, we are not free 
to impose our own view of what state law should be; rather, 
we are to apply state law as interpreted by the state's 
highest court in an effort to predict how that court would 
decide the precise legal issues before us. . . . In the absence 
of guidance from the state's highest court, we are to 
consider decisions of the state's intermediate appellate 
courts for assistance in predicting how the state's highest 
court would rule." Gares v. Willingboro Township, 90 F.3d 
720, 725 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Predicting the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's likely adjudication of the 
question presented is complicated by a sparse landscape of 
conflicting intermediate appellate case law. 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not decided 
whether punitive damages are available under the PHRA, 
although it has indirectly confronted the question of the 
available remedies under the PHRA. Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Comm'n v. Zamantakis, 387 A.2d 70, 71-73 (Pa. 
1978) (PHRC is not authorized to "award damages for 
mental anguish and humiliation which may arise as a 
result of unlawful discrimination," but courts possess 
authority to make such awards under their power to grant 
legal and equitable relief).3 One intermediate appellate court 
in Pennsylvania has held that punitive damages are 
available under the PHRA. Brown Transp. Corp. v. 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 578 A.2d 555, 562 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (no bar to punitive or compensatory 
damages in PHRA).4 However, during the pendency of this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Zamantakis was a plurality opinion with limited binding effect. Hoy v. 
Angelone, ___ A.2d ___, 1997 WL 119445, at *6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). 
 
4. District courts in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania consistently 
have held that punitive damages are available under the PHRA. Smith v. 
General Elec. Co., 1996 WL 24762, at *6 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Galeone v. 
American Packaging Corp., 764 F. Supp. 349, 351 (E.D. Pa. 1991) ("Since 
September 1990. . . most federal courts examining this issue have 
allowed punitive damage claims to remain in PHRA actions after 
predicting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would rule that punitive 
damages may be imposed under the PHRA.") (collecting cases). 
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appeal, a panel of the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated 
an award of punitive damages under the PHRA. Hoy v. 
Angelone, ___ A.2d ___, 1997 WL 119445, *6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1997). The Hoy court specifically refused to extend 
Zamantakis, noting that damages for humiliation and 
mental anguish are of a different nature and serve different 
purposes than punitive damages, and explained it was 
"unpersuaded that such damages are recoverable under the 
PHRA and. . . reluctant to allow such recovery in the 
absence of more definitive guidance" from the state 
Supreme Court. Id. 
 
At oral argument, counsel for Rush represented that a 
petition to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for allocatur 
has been filed in Hoy. It is therefore possible that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court soon will address the question 
of the availability of punitive damages under the PHRA. 
Given these circumstances, we are hesitant to consider the 
question, for to do so might produce the undesirable result 
of having the PHRA remedies available to a plaintiff differ 
depending upon the forum in which the plaintiff has sued. 
For these reasons, and because it is unnecessary to the 
disposition of this appeal, we decline to decide whether 
punitive damages are available under the PHRA. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Rush's sexual harassment claim was filed timely, and she 
has presented evidence justifying a conclusion that there 
was a continuing violation extending from prior to until 
after January 5, 1993. Thus, on remand, she should be 
permitted to introduce evidence of sexual harassment 
occurring throughout her tenure at Scott. However, her sex 
discrimination claim based on Scott's failure to promote 
and train her was time barred. The inclusion of the failure 
to promote and train claim and the evidence supporting it 
infected the entire verdict, so a remand for retrial is 
necessary on Rush's sexual harassment and constructive 
discharge claims. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment 
entered in favor of Rush on the basis of the remittitur and 
will remand the case to the district court for entry of 
judgment in favor of Scott on the failure to promote and 
train claim and for a new trial on the hostile environment 
 
                                19 
based on sexual harassment and constructive discharge 
claims. We do not disturb the disposition made in the 
district court of Rush's other claims. 
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